Abstract This paper examines the reaction of general practitioners (GPs) to a reform in 2004 in the remuneration system for using laboratory services in general practice. The purpose of this paper is to study whether income motivation exists regarding the use of laboratory services in general practice, and if so, the degree of income motivation among general practitioners (GPs) in Norway. We argue that the degree of income motivation is stronger when the physicians are uncertain about the utility of the laboratory service in question. We have panel data from actual physician-patient encounters in general practices in the years 2001-2004 and use discrete choice analysis and random effects models. Estimation results show that an increase in the fees will lead to a small but significant increase in use. The reform led to minor changes in the use of laboratory analyses in GPs' offices, and we argue that financial incentives were diluted because they were in conflict with medical recommendations and existing medical practice. The patient's age has the most influence and the results support the hypothesis that the impact of income increases with increasing uncertainty about diagnosis and treatment. The policy implication of our results is that financial incentives alone are not an effective tool for influencing the use of laboratory services in GPs' offices.
Introduction
Economic theory is largely based on the hypothesis of self-interest. In health care, the expected behaviour of physicians is different. Arrow [1, 2] and others argue that physicians have different motivation than other business people and that they are concerned for their patient's health and this influences their choices. Do physicians give advice that is completely separated from self-interest? Hillmann [3] suggests that most physicians will act in the patient's best interest when the medical decision is clear-cut and that the effect of financial incentives may be more important when the correct decision is not evident. Thus, income motivation is more likely to exist when the correct decision is not obvious or where there is a lack of medical recommendations.
The purpose of this paper is to study whether income motivation exists regarding the use of laboratory services in general practice, and if so, the degree of income motivation among general practitioners (GPs) in Norway. If a change in laboratory-related fees changes the use of laboratory services, we call it income-motivated behaviour. In this paper, we argue that the degree of income motivation is stronger when physicians are uncertain of the benefit of the medical action in question in regard to the health status of the patient.
Usually, financial incentives are used to reduce health care resources, change clinical practice or to improve the quality of health care. In these circumstances, it can be difficult to distinguish the effects of financial incentives from a wanted change without financial incentives. We study an example from Norway where a reform took place in July 2004 in the remuneration system for the use of laboratory services in general practice. The reform was carried out for political reasons and intended to move the out-of-pocket expenses paid by patients from a service utilized by the patient out of office (telephone contacts) to in-office services [4] . This reform led to financial incentives that were in conflict with medical recommendations and existing medical practice. As the remuneration system was the only change and the intention was not to change the GP's practice profile, this gives us a unique opportunity to study the effect of the financial incentives.
Laboratory analyses are widely used in diagnostic workup and monitoring of patients in primary care. Interest in using laboratory analyses in GPs' offices has been increasing in Europe [5] [6] [7] . In Norway (Source: NOK-LUS 1 ), Switzerland and the Netherlands almost all general practices have their own laboratory facilities [8] . In Norway, [9] about 24.3% of all fees in general practices in 2006 were from the use of laboratory services.
In spite of the extensive use of laboratory analyses, there is a lack of studies on the impact of laboratory results and the economic consequences of near patient laboratory results in primary care [10] . Better knowledge of the GPs' routines for use of laboratory services when there is diagnostic uncertainty may lead to interventions directed at reducing unnecessary testing [11] .
The availability of laboratory analyses in the office varies across general practices. The advantage of having the test available in the office is that the GP can get the results of the test immediately and use the results during the consultation. In contrast, if the GP sends a blood sample for analysing outside the office, it takes 1-7 days to get the results. This may delay the treatment and will usually demand more follow-up by the GP. Providing a more rapid result saves time and money because of early treatment.
The reform in the remuneration system for laboratory services consisted of an increase in the out-of-pocket payment (paid by the patient to the GP) and a decrease in the fees (paid by the State to the GP) for the most used laboratory analyses in general practice in order to retain the total revenue from laboratory services inside general practices. Before the reform, patients paid a fee only when a laboratory test was analysed outside the office. After the reform, an outof-pocket fee is paid every time a blood test is taken.
When deciding whether a laboratory analysis should be performed in the GP's office or not, it is important to consider both the diagnostic accuracy of the tests and waiting time for the alternative hospital laboratory result [12] . There are recommendations [13] listing which laboratory analyses should be performed in the GP's office (here called basic repertoire) and which laboratory analyses should be used, depending on the patient's history and symptoms. These recommendations are based on both the diagnostic accuracy of the tests and the importance of getting a result and starting treatment immediately.
The fees for the laboratory analyses in the basic repertoire were reduced by 40-80%, and after the reform, the fee is lower than the marginal costs for the test equipment. The main incentive after the reform is to stop performing basic analyses in office and to perform more laboratory analyses out of the office. Thus, the financial incentives were in conflict with the medical recommendations.
We examine the effect of the remuneration, the age of the patient and the characteristics of the GP regarding use of laboratory services in general practice. The decisions we study are:
A. Given that a blood sample is taken, whether to perform one or several of the laboratory analyses in the GP's office or whether to perform all the laboratory analyses out of the office. B. Given that the laboratory analyses are performed in the office, whether these are only basic analyses or only non-basic analyses. The alternative ''both basic and non-basic'' was excluded because we particularly wanted to study how the reform influenced the use of laboratory analyses with the most reduction in fees (basic analyses) versus laboratory analyses where there was the least reduction in fees (non-basic analyses).
We are not aware of any study that has focused on the consequences of financial incentives when they are in conflict with medical recommendations.
According to Wennberg [14] , uncertainty has a major impact on physician behaviour. Uncertainty is involved in making a diagnosis, in predicting the effects of treatment of a given condition, and in perceiving patient preferences.
We assume that the impact of income depends on the GP's uncertainty about the diagnosis and appropriate treatment of the patient. The degree of uncertainty depends on the patient's age and on the knowledge of the GP regarding the use of laboratory analyses. We investigate this hypothesis to some extent in this paper. We are not aware of any other study that addresses this issue as we do.
We have panel data from actual physician-patient encounters in general practices in the years 2001-2004 and use discrete choice analysis and random effects models. This paper gives insight into how GPs respond to financial incentives when these are in conflict with medical practice and recommendations. It also discusses what other factors influence the GPs' use of laboratory services in the office and in particular the importance of medical 1 NOKLUS (The Norwegian Quality Improvement of Laboratory Services in Primary Care) is an organization to ensure that laboratory tests performed outside hospitals are ordered, carried out, and interpreted correctly and in accordance with patients' needs for investigation, treatment, and follow-up.
uncertainty. Hence, our results have interest beyond the setting used in this article.
Literature related to our study approach
It has been argued by Mooney and Ryan [15] that ethical values may dilute the influence of economic incentives and in health care there might be relatively less need for strong external incentives. Frey [16] states that use of extrinsic (or financial) incentives may crowd out intrinsic motivation.
Previous studies have examined the effects of different remuneration systems, and it is well known that the fee-forservice system results in a higher quantity of service than the salary payment system, and also a larger number of laboratory analyses [17] . Chaix-Couturier et al. [18] concluded that financial incentives are effective with practice guidelines. Van Walraven et al. [19] found that financial incentives were effective with practice guidelines and with modification of the requisition form. Carlsen et al. [20] studied how the number of laboratory analyses taken by a sample of 44 GPs in 1991-1994 in Norway was influenced by the GPs' private economy outside the practice and by changes in remuneration. They found that changes in fees had little or no effect on four types of laboratory analyses (including one basic analysis: CRP). Grytten et al. [21] examined how the service production (the relative change in the number of laboratory tests per consultation, consultations per physician per month and the proportion of consultations lasting more than 20 min per physician) of 2,650 primary physicians in Norway was influenced by changes in the fees in the years 1995-2000. In this period, the mean increase in fees for laboratory analyses was 24.3%. They found that the fee changes had no effect on the service production.
Institutional set-up: primary physicians in Norway
In Norway, the municipalities are responsible for planning, organizing and running primary health care services. The payment system in Norway for general practitioners (GPs) is a mixture of capitation fee and fee-for-service. General practice financing is split between the State, the municipalities and the patient. Each GP has a list of patients to take care of, and the municipalities pay a per capita fee. The State pays a fee-forservice component and the patient pays an out-of-pocket expense according to a fixed schedule (''normal tariff'' [22] [23] [24] only when a laboratory test was analysed out of office. Since the reform, a fee (€5.9) is paid by the patient every time a blood test is taken in office [4] . Thus, the cost for the patient after the reform is independent of where the blood test is analysed. This fee is paid only once, even if the GP chooses to perform laboratory analyses both in and out of office. In addition, the fees for laboratory analyses performed in office have been reduced. Table 1 shows the fees and costs of the laboratory analyses where the fees had been most reduced by the Table 1 . The sum of income for the GPs from laboratory services per encounter is €5.9 after the reform if all laboratory analyses are performed out of office. If any laboratory analyses are performed in office, the total income is €5.9 plus the fee for the laboratory analyses chosen. The cost of using laboratory services in office for the GPs includes costs for laboratory equipment, personnel, and storage. Most basic analyses are simple tests for single use, and the only equipment cost is the test itself. For CRP and Glucose, a laboratory instrument is needed in addition to a strip that is used once. Table 1 shows that for CRP the strip costs €3.2 and the instrument costs €900. Personnel take blood tests and perform laboratory analyses. The GPs' cost for laboratory analyses performed outside the office includes personnel packing the blood samples and following up the laboratory results (telephone calls, return visits). The cost of transport to and from the external laboratory is zero because external laboratories covered these costs during this period.
After the reform, the marginal net revenue for performing laboratory analyses in office for most basic analyses was negative. Including the fee for taking the blood test (€5.9), the total revenue from laboratory services could be higher than before the reform, particularly if no or only one basic analysis was performed.
Hypotheses
In this section, we present our main hypotheses on the two medical decisions A and B.
As a result of the existence of medical recommendations about which laboratory analyses should be performed in the GP's office [13] , we expect that an increase in laboratory fees will not affect or only slightly increase the probability of performing laboratory analyses in office, and performing only basic analyses.
Regarding patient's age, infections and the use of basic analyses (CRP, Strep A) dominate in the encounters with the youngest. Among the oldest patients, more complex issues (e.g. atrial fibrillation) dominate (non-basic analysis: PT-INR). We therefore expect the estimated signs of the effects to be negative for older patients compared to younger patients regarding decision B. As the basic analyses are the main part of laboratory analyses being performed in office, our expectations are similar for decision A, Several studies [25] [26] [27] [28] have found that older GPs use fewer laboratory analyses than younger GPs. This may be because more experienced (older) GPs or GPs with additional education (a speciality) know which laboratory analyses to use and therefore use fewer laboratory analyses than younger GPs or GPs without a speciality. In addition, younger GPs were trained in an environment more oriented to laboratory investigations than their more senior colleagues, and more laboratory analyses were available to them during their training [27] . Using fewer laboratory analyses will increase the probability of performing analyses in office more often and results in more encounters with only basic analyses versus only non-basic analyses. Thus, we expect the estimated signs of the effect for older GPs or GPs with a speciality to be positive for decisions A and B.
The repertoire of available laboratory analyses in office varies across general practices. Group practices have more patients than solo practices, and the average cost of having laboratory equipment will decrease with the number of patients. Thue and Sandberg [29] have shown that group practices have a wider spectrum of laboratory analyses, and Fauli and Thue [30] found that having a test available in a practice increases its use. Other studies show inconsistent results: Vinker et al. [31] found that GPs in a larger practice ordered more laboratory analyses per patient than physicians in a smaller practice. Verstappen et al. [28] concluded with the opposite result regarding group practices with more than two GPs, and the authors assume that this is probably a result of general discussions and reflections on practice behaviour in these group practices. We expect that, as their repertoire is wider, GPs in group practices will perform analyses in office more often and have fewer encounters with only basic analyses versus only non-basic analyses. Thus, we expect the estimated signs of the effect to be positive for decision A and negative for decision B.
The GP's uncertainty about the utility of the laboratory service depends on the GP's knowledge and experience with the use of laboratory services and the type of patient. According to Hillman [3] , income is expected to have less influence when the GP has more knowledge about laboratory services than when the GP has less knowledge. To check this, we introduced interaction terms between the income variable and variables related to knowledge and experience (GP's age, speciality, and type of practice). Like Verstappen [28] , we expect that GPs in group practices have collegial discussions and are less uncertain of the expected health outcome of the use of the laboratory service in question than less experienced GPs or GPs in solo practices. Thus, we expect that the estimated signs for the interaction terms between income and the two oldest GP age groups, speciality and group practices, to be negative.
Uncertainty about diagnosis and treatment depends on patient age and on the laboratory service in question. In the youngest patients, basic analyses are the most often used laboratory analyses, in the oldest patients the GPs are often more uncertain about diagnoses when basic analyses are used compared to when they use non-basic analyses. Nonbasic analyses are often used to monitor older patients and in these situations the GP is certain of the diagnosis. Thus, we expect the estimated sign of the effects of the interaction terms for decisions A and B to be positive for older patients compared with the youngest patients.
Data and descriptions
We used actual physician-patient data from encounters in general practices obtained from the Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD). Ten percentage of the GPs are municipal employees on a fixed salary. Our data are from all electronic bills to NIA from GPs during October, and only includes GPs with a private practice and a contract with the municipality, and encounters where blood tests have been taken. Because we have data from 3 years before the reform, we can detect trends in the use of laboratory services before the reform (ref. Fig. 1 ). We excluded groups with encounters with deviant characteristics-GPs over 67 years of age and patients younger than 0 years and older than 100 years-thus reducing our data set to 1,390,715 encounters. Data from patients older than 100 years were excluded on advice from NSD, due to suspected error in the data. At decision B, the population is reduced from 1,390,715 to 696,861 encounters. Here we only studied patient-physician encounters where laboratory analyses were analysed in office, and excluded 506,760 encounters where laboratory analyses were only performed outside the office. After we excluded the group of encounters with both basic and non-basic analyses (N = 187,094), we had a data set with 696,861 encounters.
Dependent variables
Our data sets only provide information about laboratory analyses that are reimbursed and performed in office. The dependent variables are coded as follows: -1 if the GP performed one or several laboratory analyses in the office and 0 if all the analyses were performed out of office. -1 if the GP only performed basic analyses in office, and 0 if only non-basic analyses were performed in the office. Figure 1 shows that there has been an increase in the percentage of encounters where laboratory analyses are only done outside the office (from around 35% to almost 40% after the reform). The decrease in the percentage of encounters with blood tests where the GP performs laboratory analyses in office (from 65 to 60%) is due to a decrease in the share of encounters where only basic analyses were performed, and a decrease in the share of encounters with both types of analysis.
The Fig. 1 shows that above 70% of all encounters in office include basic analyses.
Explanatory variables
The explanatory variables are listed in Table 2 . Centrality in Table 2 refers to the geographical location of the general practice in a municipality in relation to densely populated areas according to the 1994 standard for municipal classification [32] .
We compared the GP characteristics of age, sex, share of specialists and geographical location in our samples of GPs with the population of Norwegian GPs in the period [45, 46] . We found that our sample of GPs had the same mean value regarding age as the population of GPs and had almost similar geographical location. But our sample had a slightly higher percentage of males (76 vs. 71%), and a higher proportion of GPs with a speciality (67 vs. 57%) than the population of GPs in the period. NIA informs that some data may have been deleted due to storage capacity and this, in addition to the fact that we only have electronic bills, may be the reason why our data have a higher share of male GPs and a higher proportion of GPs with a speciality than the population of GPs. We face a simultaneity problem because income from fees depends directly on the laboratory services chosen and is therefore endogenous. In addition we do not have information about laboratory analyses that are performed out of the office. To deal with these problems, we use price indices and construct exogenous proxies for the income variables. Based on the fees in the normal tariff [4, [22] [23] [24] and information from the Norwegian Insurance Administration (NIA) about quantities per fee per tariff year, we created Fisher ideal indices, Fisher [33] . The details of how this was done and the development in the Fisher indices appear in Online Resource 2.
We wanted to study the effect of a change in the differences between the Fisher indices for the alternative choices. Table 3 shows the development of these differences in each year.
The Table shows that the last year the difference for decision A is -0.27, meaning that the Fisher index for performing laboratory analyses out of office has increased by 0.27 compared to the Fisher index for performing laboratory analyses in office.
Empirical models
The modelling framework is based on the theory of discrete choice analysis [34, 35] .
We want to establish models regarding the use of laboratory services in the GP's office for predicting the probability of the two decisions A and B.
We model the probabilities as a function of the GP's income (represented by the difference in the Fisher indices), the GP in question (age, sex, etc.) and patient's age. At all decisions, the GP has two possible choices that are mutually exclusive, so we use binary models.
The models are estimated based on different data sets (see Table 2 ), and this is further discussed in ''Discussion'' section.
The model is as follows: we assume that the GPs have preferences regarding the different alternatives that can be represented by a random utility function. The utility of an alternative depends on the GP's income or cost associated with the alternative, ethical considerations, reputation and The standard deviation is in brackets status. Increases in the patient's health are assumed to increase the GP's utility. The trade-off between the welfare of the patient and the GP's income will differ depending on the situation, the GP's knowledge of laboratory services and the GP's loyalty to medical recommendations. As regards decision A, the trade-off is between the utility of receiving the test result during the consultation compared to the utility of the quality of the laboratory test. The utility of analysing in office versus out of the office depends on how important it is to get the answer during the same consultation. Analysing in the GP's office is timesaving with less following up than analysing outside, but the quality of the laboratory analyses in an external laboratory may be better (higher sensitivity and specificity). As regards decision B, the utility of using only basic analyses versus non-basic analyses depends on the type of patient.
Encounters are nested; each GP has several observations in the data set. GPs are in turn nested in local geographical areas and grouped by centrality, thus giving our data a hierarchical structure. The GPs are grouped into four categories of centrality, and we choose to represent these as dummies. Because the Fisher indices are a macro index, we could not estimate a model with time dummies.
Previous studies [11, 36] have found that test-ordering behaviour is partly based on the GP's personal habits and characteristics, and not only on the patient's signs and symptoms. Since we have many observations by the same decision-makers, we take account of unobservable GPspecific heterogeneity in our specification. We represent permanent unobserved heterogeneity in preferences at the GP level by using random effect specification.
Let U iejt be the utility of GP i as evaluated by GP i in encounter number e, given alternative j = 1,2 at time t. For decision A, j = 1 if laboratory analyses are performed in the office and j = 2 if all laboratory analyses are performed outside the office. For decision B, j = 1 if only basic analyses are performed in office and j = 2 if only nonbasic analyses are performed in office. The GP will choose j = 1 if U ie1t [ U ie2t ; which is equivalent to U ie1t À U ie2t [ 0: If the inequality is reversed alternative 2 will be chosen. Thus, we realize that it is sufficient to model the utility difference for representing the choices.
We assume that U iejt is stochastic. The motivation for this is that the GP's preferences may depend on variables known to him but unobserved by the researcher. For example, there will be non-systematic variation in choices that cannot be explained by the variables available to the researcher, especially those stemming from patient-physician interaction. In addition, the GP may have unstable preferences, meaning that he or she may have problems in evaluating the utility of the different alternatives. This means that the GP may make different choices in seemingly identical choice settings. The variation in responses across seemingly identical choice settings may change because colleagues, medical case records and experience gained from treating other patients have a continuous influence on the GP. 3 We assume that the utility function has the structure
where X ie is a vector of characteristics of the GP i (gender, age, education, type of practice and location) and the patient's age in encounter e. a j , b j , c j and h j are vectors of parameters and u ij is a time constant random term that is independent of e iejt . The terms u ij and e iejt are random variables that are assumed to be normally distributed with zero mean. The term e iejt is the stochastic term that is supposed to account for unobserved variables of the GP that affect his preferences. Moreover, e iejt , t = 1, 2, …, are i.i.d. over time. The term u ij represents the individual specific level of the utility difference across seemingly identical choice settings accounts for the GP's practice style.
The variable I jt is a proxy variable for the incomes associated with alternative j at time t, and it is constructed as the difference between the Fisher indices, cf. Table 3 . Z ie is a vector of variables (patient's age, GP's age, group practice and postgraduate qualifications) we assume influence the impact of the income variable. From (1), it follows that the difference in utility equals
As mentioned earlier, the two random components are assumed to be independent of each other, with E(
representing the correlation coefficient between the utility differences of two encounters from the same GP.
Let
. That is, let P 1 (V iet ) is the probability of GP i choosing alternative 1 for a patient in 3 In addition, the GP's choice setting can be viewed as a case of choice between lotteries because of the uncertainty of both the initial health status of the patient and the laboratory analyses. An example of the latter is the use of the Helicobacter Pylori Rapid Test (HPRT). The uncertainty of the laboratory analysis occurs because the HPRT measures antibodies to the HP bacteria and not the disease as such, and because healthy carriers of the HP bacteria exist. Because some patients are carriers of HP without being ill, the use of the test result will depend on the GP's knowledge of HP. In this sense, the utility function defined above can be interpreted as a (subjective) expected utility of the GP. However, we shall continue to refer to it simply as the utility function.
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encounter e in year t, where we for convenience use V iet to represent the vector of explanatory variables. Similarly, let P 1 (V iet |u i ) be the corresponding choice probability of choosing alternative 1 given the random effect u i . Hence, the conditional probability of choosing alternative 1 given the random effect is given by
where U is the standard cumulative normal distribution function and b represents the vector of unknown parameters associated with the variable vector V iet . One can show (see McFadden and Reid [37] and Online Resource 4) that the corresponding unconditional choice probability is given by
where E u denotes the expectation with respect to u and k ¼ ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
The expression in (4) is used to compute the effect of changes in explanatory variables.
The model is estimated by the maximum-likelihood method. The corresponding likelihood is given in the Online Resource 4.
If the variance of the random effect is different from zero, the random effects model fits the data better than the model without random effects. We use standard econometric software provided by NLOGIT [38] to estimate a random effects probit model. We tested for unobserved heterogeneity by estimating a model with random effects and a H 0 saying that all estimated individual effects are equal. The LR-test rejected H 0 with a level of statistical significance of less than 1% at all decisions. Table 4 shows the estimated parameters of the random effects probit models, given by (3), and provides information about the sign and relative magnitude of the effects. At both the two medical choices, q is significant.
Results

Estimation results
The results in Table 4 support most of our hypotheses (see ''Hypotheses'' section). For all decisions, the effect of the income variable (I jt ) is positive. The total effect of income will depend on the situation we study due to the interaction terms are negative. The total effect of income is positive but for decision B, if the GP are older and work in a group practice, the income effect will be very small in magnitude.
GPs in group practices will perform laboratory analyses in office more often and have fewer encounters with only basic analyses versus only non-basic analyses. This seems sensible as group practices have a wider spectrum of laboratory analyses available [29] , and the availability of laboratory analyses in practice increase the use [30] . Female GPs use more blood tests than male GPs, and this also agrees with previous studies [26, 27, 31, 39] .
The results (shown by the sign of the parameter of the interaction terms) support our hypothesis that the degree of income motivation is stronger when GPs are uncertain about the utility of the laboratory service. The exceptions are that the impact of income is higher for older versus younger GPs at decision A, and for GPs who are specialists at decision B.
The effect of changes in significant variables
We wanted to study the magnitude of the effect of significant variables on the probability of decisions A and B. Estimations of models including only significant variables appear in Table B1 in Online Resource 3. We use these results in calculating the effect of changes in significant variables. The marginal effects on the probability are listed in Table 5 for a particular GP 4 (after this named ''our case''), and some of the calculations are shown in Online Resource 4.
In Table 5 , we study the effect of changing one variable at a time while keeping everything else constant. In particular, we want to study how the marginal effect of the independent variables varies with the income variable (differences between the Fisher indices, I jt from Eq. 4). To find the effect of the income variable and the interaction terms, we study the marginal effects when I jt = 0 (as for the basic year) and when I jt = 0.1. When I jt = 0.1 the Fisher index for the first alternative has increased by 0.1 versus the second alternative.
The Table shows that the income variable has the least influence on the probability for both the decisions. Similarly, for decision A the probability increases from 67.2 to 67.9% and from 85.8 to 86.3% for decision B, when I jt increase from 0 to 0.1. In interpreting the results, we focus on when I jt = 0. If the Fisher index for the first alternative increases by 0.08 compared to the second alternative choice, the probability for choosing alternative 1 will increase by 0.5% point for decision A and by 0.4% point for decision B.
The patient's age has the most effect, particularly at decision B. If the patient's age is 76 versus 10 years, the probability of performing only basic versus non-basic analyses decreases by 50.6% point (from 85.8 to 35.2%).
We are particularly interested in the effect of the interaction terms. We find the effect of the interaction terms in Table 5 by comparing the effect of the variables: patient's age, GP's age, group practice and postgraduate qualifications, when I jt = 0 versus when I jt = 0.1. When I jt = 0 the interaction terms have no effect. Table 4 showed that the impact of income is more for older patients versus younger patients for decision B. If the patient's age is 35 versus 10 years, Table 5 shows that the probability of performing basic analyses in office will decrease by 19.5% point at I jt = 0 and by 19.1% point at I jt = 0.1. The difference by 0.4% point (-19.1 ?19.5 ) is the effect of the interaction term. If the patient's age is 76 versus 10 years, there is a difference in the probability by 1.2% point (-49.4 ?50.6) when I jt increases from 0 to 0.1. Thus, the probability for performing analyses in office is increasing for older versus younger patients due to the income.
Discussion
We will now discuss our results and some objections to the arguments and methods we have used. Recall that time dummies can be used to study whether there are trend effects in the use of the laboratory service in question. We could not include time dummies in our model because this would lead to identification problems because the Fisher indices do not vary across individuals. In our case, any existing trend in using laboratory services is partly included in the effect of the Fisher index because the yearly quantities of laboratory service are included in the index. Thus, it is not possible to distinguish between the income and the trend effect. But as the level of performing laboratory analyses in the GP's office-or to analyse only basic analyses or non-basic analyses in GP's office has been stable before the reform with constant fees (see Fig. 1 ), the trend effect is minimal and the effect of the Fisher index is mostly due to the income effect. Secondly, analysing only out of office often demands more follow-up from the GPs, partly because more analyses are easily ordered when filling out a requisition form. The cost of the follow-up will vary between GPs and depends on the type of laboratory analyses and local routines for follow-up. These costs reduce the utility of analysing only outside the office and reduce the effect of the financial incentives to analyse outside the GP's office.
Thirdly, we only have information about the analyses performed in office and reimbursed, and not about the laboratory analyses that are analysed outside the office or about laboratory analyses e.g. Erythrocyte Sedimentation Rate (ESR) and Haemoglobin (HB), which are not reimbursed. As GPs do not carry any costs of the laboratory analyses done outside the office (except the cost of more follow-ups), it is possible that, in order to compensate for the loss after the reform, the GPs may add laboratory analyses that are not reimbursed on the requisition form. In our further research, we would like to study the development in the use of laboratory analyses analysed outside the office.
Fourthly, data from the last year were only collected 4-5 months after the reform, and there may be a time lag before the reform has any effect on a GP's practice profile. When it was introduced, the reform was widely debated in Norway among GPs on their discussion page on the Internet, so it seems likely that the GPs were aware of the changes in the remuneration system. The long-term effects may come later for laboratory analyses when it is necessary to invest in new laboratory equipment. We assume that physicians will weigh benefits and costs before investing in new instruments. For analyses in the basic repertoire, the necessary investments are not major (ref. development in fees and delayed investment in new equipment. The long-term effect of the reform may be a decline in analysing in office, and lower test quality due to old laboratory equipment. Fifthly, we have in our paper only focused on the response of GPs due to changes in the reimbursement fee schedule for tests. After the reform, the patients pay more because they pay an out-of-pocket payment each time a laboratory analysis is taken-and not only if laboratory analyses are sent away. After the reform, the patients demand for tests may decrease or the patients may have been more willing to have their tests sent out of office as the monetary cost to them is the same and the quality of the out of office test may be higher. But the reform was new, and it is not likely that the change in fees was known among the patients. In USA, Monheit [40] found that 10% of the population used 69% of the health services. Because over 20% of the population in Norway in 2003 and 2004 reached the ceiling for out-of-pocket expenses, it is not likely that the increase in payment influences the GPs in their behaviour.
Sixthly, in this paper we have studied the two decisions by using two models. We could have estimated them in one multinomial model instead and plan to do this for future similar analyses.
Seventhly, we have only studied the use of laboratory services in office and do not know whether GPs may have compensated for the reform by using more of other services with positive net marginal revenue.
Eighthly, we have studied the effect of financial incentives on the use of laboratory analyses in general practice when the incentives are in conflict with medical recommendations. Since the reform in 2004 the fees for all the basic analyses have increased [41] . This increase in fees is in line with medical practice, and we would like to study the effect of the income in this setting.
Finally, our results show that there has been an increase in the use of taking blood tests after the reform. We have only studied the use of type of analyses (basic or non-basic) in office. Recall that the total revenue from using laboratory and basic analyses can be higher after the reform, particularly when only one laboratory analysis is performed due to the out-of-pocket fee. There are also differences between laboratory analyses regarding how much the fee was reduced (see Table 1 ), and the GP may for example compensate by using more basic analyses that are less reduced than those that are most reduced (e.g. Glucose), or using fewer laboratory analyses per encounter. In our future research, we would like to study the development in composition of laboratory analyses per encounter by studying the development in number of laboratory analyses per encounter and the use of typical sets of laboratory analyses.
Conclusion
Physicians are influenced by many different motives such as ethical conduct, standards of care and service motives [2] . Our results show that income motivation among GPs regarding the use of laboratory services exists. Since the reform led to minor changes in the use of laboratory analyses in the GPs' offices, we suggest that the financial incentives were diluted because they were in conflict with medical recommendations and existing medical practice. Our result illustrates that the presence of ethical considerations in the GP's utility function counteracts incentives that may arise from the remuneration system.
We suggest that our results are valid before the GP needs to invest in new laboratory instruments. In the long run, the reform may lead to a decline in analysing in office because the occurrence of fees below costs prevents investment in new instruments.
A policy implication of our results is that economic incentives alone are not an effective tool for influencing the use of laboratory services in GPs' offices. The results support the suggestions by several [3, 15, 18, 42] : income motivation is more likely to exist when the correct decision is not obvious. When using financial incentives, it is important to consider the degree of professional uncertainty, as financial incentives will have more influence when the degree of professional uncertainty is high or in areas where there is a lack of professional consensus (medical recommendations). Correspondingly, financial incentives are less likely to influence medical decisions when the incentives conflict with medical guidelines that are internalized by physicians.
